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12.1  Introduction 
Private pensions represent the contract between workers and their em- 
ployers. The future benefits of  the pensions are an asset for the workers 
who hold them. The contractual obligations of the plan to the worker are 
quite complex. Benefits are due in a variety of circumstances, in each of 
which a complicated formula may be employed to determine the amount 
to be paid. Plans differ both in the description in these circumstances and 
in the nature of these formulas. 
It is important to recognize that the pension does not represent a claim 
to a perfectly certain stream of resources. Plans with differing provisions 
will differ both in the mean payoff and in its variability. Moreover, when 
computing the mean and the variability of pension benefits the age of the 
worker and his length of job tenure should be considered. Different plans 
may favor different sets of workers. 
The object of this paper is to discover how the alternative forms of the 
pension contract affect these means and variabilities for workers of dif- 
ferent circumstances. Specifically, I aim to provide some information rel- 
evant to the following questions. How should workers evaluate respective 
benefit packages offered to  them by different plans? How does this assess- 
ment depend on the workers’ expectations of economic risks such as fluc- 
tuations in wages, interest rates, and inflation? How does it depend on 
their beliefs about longevity, disability, retirement, and their propensity 
toward mobility in employment? Will the evaluation of  different plans 
differ  markedly for workers of different ages and job tenure? 
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It may be useful at the outset to reflect on the sources of risk faced by a 
worker enrolled in a pension plan. Some risks, such as fluctuations in the 
price level or interest rate, are common to all workers living at the same 
time. Others, like the future wage of a worker on which a pension may be 
based, are correlated across workers covered in the same plan. They are 
also positively correlated for workers in different plans or different indus- 
tries. Finally, individual-specific risks such as death and disability are un- 
likely to be strongly correlated even among workers in the same plan. 
In addition, we must consider risk factors that are not exogenous to the 
individual. For a worker with vested benefits, his decision to leave the 
firm would cause a reduction in the benefits he  would receive from his 
pension plan on retirement. Moreover, for those plans with an early re- 
tirement provision,  such a decision would change the value of  accrued 
benefits. Workers who are not fully vested face even more of a loss when 
they voluntarily terminate employment. 
The complexity of pension plans and the multifaceted nature of the 
risks mentioned above make it impossible to conduct a purely theoretical 
analysis of the questions in which we are interested. Therefore, the meth- 
odology of this paper will be to use simulation analysis. I compare four 
different forms of  a pension contract.  I simulate the economically rel- 
evant events during the worker’s lifetime, both macroeconomic events 
and the individual-specific  events mentioned above, as they evolve during 
his lifetime. To the extent possible I have used current actuarial projections. 
The analysis in this paper has importance for studying the impact of 
private pensions in the national economy. Most studies to date have re- 
garded the pension asset as a claim to a perfectly certain stream of con- 
sumption for the worker. It is clear that this is far from the case. In studying 
saving behavior, for example, it is important to distinguish between indi- 
viduals’ holdings of financial assets in their own name and the amount of 
their private pension wealth. The two are far from perfect substitutes. 
Similar considerations apply for the issuers of pensions. Firms have an 
implicit liability to their pension holders. The riskiness of this liability has 
not as yet been treated. Because pensions cover a large number of work- 
ers, the law of large numbers mitigates those components of the risk that 
are due to individual-specific events. However, macroeconomic risks do 
affect the realized present value of aggregate plan liabilities. Therefore, 
even if pensions were recognized by both sides of the “pension market” as 
a form of contractual arrangement that should be incorporated into their 
respective wealth calculations,  the net effect on national savings might 
very well be nonzero because the relevant risks cannot be perfectly in- 
sured. The certainty equivalent value of a pension for workers in the plan 
is probably much less than the value of the liability that it represents to the 
stockholder in the firm. Therefore, distributional considerations  aside, 
pensions decrease the value of other forms of saving by workers by less 359  The Riskiness of Private Pensions 
than they increase the required saving by stockholders necessary to offset 
their indirect pension liabilities. 
By  providing information about the risks inherent in pension contracts 
this paper will be a useful and important ingredient in the analysis of the 
role of private pensions in the economy. In addition, by comparing differ- 
ent plans with respect to their riskiness, insight might be gained into the 
problem of designing new plans and into the selection of benefit changes 
in existing plans that would be most beneficial to their members. 
12.2  Description of Plans to Be Compared 
I compare four hypothetical forms of pension plans. These plans differ 
both in the way that they compute benefit levels for retired workers and in 
the circumstances other than retirement under which benefits are paid. 
There are three types of  these payments: early retirement, disability, and 
death benefits. Some of the plans provide benefits to a surviving spouse in 
the event  of  preretirement  death.  None provides postretirement  death 
benefits. 
The four plans studied also differ slightly in the vesting formulas used. 
Basically, they provide for 10-year vesting, but two of them gradually in- 
crease the vesting level from 50% at the tenth year to 100% at the fifteenth 
year of service. 
The most important difference among the plans is in the way the bene- 
fits are computed. 
In Plan 0, a “conventional” plan, benefits are proportional to the aver- 
age of the highest 10 annual compensations. The proportion is increasing 
linearly with years of service. In Plan 1, a “pattern” plan, the benefit is a 
fixed dollar sum per year of service. Plans 2 and 3 are more complex. Plan 
2 is a “career average” plan.  The benefit is  a fixed proportion of each 
year’s compensation. This plan is favorable to workers with long tenure in 
the firm. Plan 3, a “final salary basis” plan, is a mixture of a proportion 
of the individual’s highest salary plus a bonus for workers with very long 
tenure. In addition, Plan 3 uses the worker’s best four years as a base for 
the computations, whereas Plan 2 bases benefits on the compensation re- 
ceived in all years. 
Table 12.1 summarizes these provisions. 
12.3  Description of the Simulation of Benefits Received 
12.3.1  General Description 
Two sets of  simulations were conducted. The first takes the plans pre- 
cisely as specified above. The second suppresses all pension benefits ex- 
cept the retirement benefit. This enables us to focus more clearly on the Table 12.1  Plans 
Early  Death Benefit 
Plan  Vesting  Retirement  Disability  (Preretirement)  Benefit 
0  10 years  - 
Conventional 
1  10 years 
Pattern 
2  10 years: 50%  + 
Career  10% for each 
average  additional year. 5 
years if age + 
service 2  45: 50% 
+ 10% for each 
additional year. Age 
60: 100% 
3  10 years: 50%  + 
Final  10% for each 
salary  additional year. 5 
years if age  + 
service 2 45: 50% 
+ 10% for each 
additional year. Age 
60:  100% 
a)Age 55 
Pension minus 3% for 
each year under 65 (or if 
less, by 3% for 
85 -age  + service) 
@Age 62 
Full pension if  10 years’ 
service 
Age 55 and 10 years’ 
service. Reduce pension 
by 2.2% per year for 
first 3 years below 65; 
4.8% per year thereafter 
Age 50 and 15 years’ 
service. Pension reduced 
by 695% for each year 
age if  less than 65 
10 years’ service 
Full pension 
Age 55 or more 
Spouse receives 50% of 
early retirement benefit 
for life 
Age 55, 10 years’ service.  None 
Reduce pension by 2.2% 
per year for first 3 years 
below 65; 4.8% per year 
thereafter 
1 !h%  per year of  service times 
average of  highest  10 annual 
compensation 
$144 per year for each year of 
service 
%% of  1973 compensation times 
years of service prior to 1975 + 
?4% of  each subsequent year’s 
compensation 
None  Age 50 and 15 years  55% of  annual compensation in 
Spouse receives 50%  of  highest 4 consecutive years + !h 070 
early benefit  extra for each year of  service over 
30, up to maximum of  65% of 
average annual compensation in 4 
highest consecutive years 361  The Riskiness of Private Pensions 
differences in the retirement benefit formulas. I shall now describe how 
the common components of these two simulations were set up. These in- 
clude the macroeconomic risks, the worker’s wage process, and the indi- 
vidual risks to which each worker is exposed. 
The simulation of benefits is based on the presumption that the struc- 
ture of the plan will remain fixed. The plans’ basic provisions for computing 
benefits determine their risk characteristics. In order to calculate benefits 
for Plans 0, 2, and 3, we need to know the worker’s wage history. Plan 1 
does not require a wage history because it is a flat benefit per year of  ser- 
vice. The wage process, therefore, is the first essential piece of informa- 
tion that must be simulated. 
Although we assume that the structure of  plans is fixed, we do not as- 
sume that the precise provisions are immutable. Quite to the contrary, we 
presume that the level of benefits specified in the pattern plan, Plan 1, will 
be updated so as to reflect the rise in real wages of the average worker, 
over time. It is important to note, therefore, that it is the average worker’s 
wage that affects Plan 1 payoffs, whereas it is  the individual worker’s 
wage that is an input into the other calculations. 
The risk characteristics of Plan 1 are different from the other plans for 
this reason. Workers in Plan 1 are at risk for fluctuations in the difference 
between the adjusted dollar benefit level and actual inflation. But they are 
not at risk for the difference between their own personal compensations 
and the average over all workers in the plan. 
The demographic factors are the second major ingredient in the simula- 
tions: job leaving, disability, death, and death of a spouse where this is 
relevant. 
My procedure is as follows. The age and years of experience of an indi- 
vidual are fixed. For example, assume that the individual is now 30 years 
old and has already been in the plan for five years at the time when the 
simulation is performed. It is assumed that the worker receives compensa- 
tion in the current year. Thereafter, annually, I simulate the wage of all 
workers,  his wage, and his demographic  status. If  he or his  surviving 
spouse is due benefits under any plan, I keep track of  them. Thus, at the 
end of each individual’s lifetime I have a record of the stream of benefits 
received and the circumstances under which they were paid. From this se- 
ries one can compute, retrospectively, its present value and its present val- 
ues conditional on the occurrence of various events. 
For every age/experience situation, and each plan, I run a sample of 
900 individuals through the simulated lifetime described above. Experi- 
mentation has indicated that this size is enough to eliminate most of the 
sampling variance and to provide fairly accurate evidence on the risks due 
to the random factors driving the simulation. 
In the next two subsections I provide the details of the simulation meth- 
ods for the wage rates and the demographic factors, respectively. 362  Jerry R.  Green 
12.3.2  Simulation of Wage Process 
The initial wage in all cases was taken to be $20,000. Because I am pri- 
marily interested in the risks faced by workers relative to their total wages 
or total compensations, one can regard this merely as a normalization. 
The growth rate of average wages from t to t + 1 is denoted Wt. For the 
individual worker it is wI. Suppose that 
w,  = W,  + qr, 
where 7, is a normal random variable, independently and identically dis- 
tributed over time. The parameter q is assumed to have a mean of zero and 
a standard deviation of .005. 
As the individual ages, shocks via qt are cumulative. It is the idiosyn- 
cratic component of rate of growth of his wages that evolves independent- 
ly. 
The stochastic structure of  Wl is autoregressive:  Wr =  el,  where E,  = 
PEl- 1 + Uf. 
The parameter p is taken to be .9 and the mean and standard deviation 
of U,  are assumed to be .001 and .002179,  respectively. Thus the mean of  W, 
is .01, as is the mean of w,. 
For Plans 0,2,  and 3, the resulting individual wage for a worker with s 
years of service in the future is 
ws = 20,000[ 1=o  .Sr  (1 + w,)]  ,s = 1,2,.  .  . 
The series wo,  wl,  . . . ,  w,, . . . forms the basis of compensation and the 
benefit package. 
In Plan 1, a different computation for pension benefits is used, based 
on average wages rather than on the personal wage of  the individual in 
question, 
iv5 = 20,000[  ;r  (1  + WJ]  ,s = 1,2,.  . . 
r=o 
and the annual retirement benefit is simply 
- 
$144  x A  x T, 
20,000 
where T is the number of years of  service at retirement. 
Because of the positive drift in real wages built into this process, virtually 
all workers will have a higher real wage on retirement than they do at the 
date when the simulation is undertaken. However, because of the cumula- 
tive effect of  q,, which represents promotions  and other random vari- 
ations due to the profitability or lack thereof  in the firm or industry in 
question which may affect the wages of  its workers, there will be a sub- 
stantial variation across workers, and increasingly so as time passes. 
I initiate the simulation for various ages of workers, in each case trying 
to assess the remaining risk in the plan benefits and their correlation with 363  The Riskiness of Private Pensions 
the worker’s wage. The parameter specifications above determine the dis- 
tribution of the worker’s terminal wage, at age 65, and how its variance 
breaks down into the part due to aggregate real wage fluctuation and the 
idiosyncratic component. This breakdown is shown in the unnumbered 
table below. 
Standard 
Deviation  Fraction of Variance 
EWS,  of E W,,  Due to 


































The possible states in which a worker or his beneficiary can be found 
within my simulation are shown in figure 12.1 below. 
It can be seen that the passage through this flowchart is governed by the 
probabilities of transition from working to the three other states. In the 
first set of simulations, I assume that these are a function of age only, not 
Simulation of  Events in Workers’ Lifetimes 
II  worker  vested? 
Retirement  benefits 
cornpuled  b04ed  on 
wage  record  tn  this 
Continue 
record and 
Fig. 12.1  One step in simulation of a worker’s pension benefits. 364  Jerry R. Green 
of experience. In the second set of simulations, the probability of  with- 
drawal from employment is allowed to depend on both age and experi- 
ence. Table 12.2 gives the probabilities used. 
For the simulation of spouses’ lifetimes, I used the age-specific mortal- 
ity for men shifted by eight years. Three years represents the average age 
differential of husband and wife, and the remaining five years is an at- 
tempt to capture the different mortality probabilities for men and women. 
It approximates standard actuarial practice. 
Table 12.3 presents the assumed mortality table, up to age 110, where 
the simulation of lifetimes was always terminated. 
The specific features of this flowchart embody the characteristics of the 
benefit packages studied and  some other special features owing to the 
limitations on our actuarial knowledge. 
1. No early retirement is provided for in this flowchart, even though 
Plans 1,2,  and 3 have early retirement provisions. The reason is that I do 
not have estimates of early retirement probabilities. Many “disabilities” 
are probably early retirements of a certain kind. To incorporate early re- 
tirements separately would require some reduction in the assumed disabil- 
ity probabilities, and the extent of this is beyond my knowledge. 
Moreover, the early retirement benefits provided by these plans are ar- 
ranged to approximate an actuarially fair payment of the accrued benefit. 
For example, if  a worker age 55 retires in Plan 1, he receives 70% of the 
pension he would have received at age 62. If he were simply to withdraw, 
he would get these benefits in full beginning at age 62. Depending on his 
mortality, the value of that stream could be higher or lower than the early 
retirement benefits. 
Finally, I suspect there is a substantial amount of adverse selection in 
the early retirement decision. Workers who know that they are in poor 
health or are unlikely to have long lifetimes for some other reason are 
more likely to take this option. It would therefore be a mistake to use the 
same mortality tables for this self-selected population as for the workers 
as a whole. Because the magnitude of  this effect is unknown, it seemed 
simpler to  leave these workers out entirely. 
2. No plans pay spouse benefits except in the event of preretirement 
death. Therefore the presence or absence of a spouse and the subsequent 
lifetime of  the spouse need only be simulated down that branch of the 
tree. 
3. For workers who withdraw from the plan after they have vested 
benefits, no provisions of the plan are operative except for the retirement 
benefit at age 65. Therefore, for these workers I need not keep track of 
their  subsequent  employment or disability status.  Only their  lifetimes 
need to be simulated. 
4. The disability benefits provided by Plans 1 and 2 are paid only to 
vested workers. Assume that the spouse of a disabled worker who subse- 365  The Riskiness of Private Pensions 
Table 12.2  Age-Specific Probabilities of Death, Withdrawal, and Disability as 
Assumed in the Simulation (Percentage of  the Population at Risk in 
the Indicated Age Group) 
Age  Death  Withdrawal  Disability 
~  -  ~~  ~ 
20  .0044  24.30  .0263 
21  .0463  22.44  ,0266 
22  .0488  20.70  0270 
23  .05 13  19.07  .027 1 
24  .0538  17.56  .0274 
25  .0569  16.15  ,0275 
26  .0602  14.85  .0278 
27  .0636  13.64  .0281 
28  .0679  12.53  .0279 
29  .0717  11.51  .0283 
30  .0763  10.58  .0382 
31  .0817  9.73  .0382 
32  .0872  8.95  .0381 
33  .0940  8.26  .0382 
34  .loo6  7.63  .0386 
35  .I080  7.08  .0386 
36  .1164  6.57  .0487 
37  .1261  6.13  .0586 
38  .I360  5.74  .0680 
39  .I475  5.40  .0781 
40  .I593  5.11  .0873 
41  .1748  4.86  .0971 
42  .1945  4.65  .1177 
43  .2208  4.47  .1365 
44  .2509  4.32  .1566 
45  .2852  4.20  .1762 
46  .3240  4.09  .1952 
47  .3680  4.01  .2156 
48  .4131  3.93  .2442 
49  .4640  3.87  .2751 
50  S165  3.80  .3034 
51  .5757  3.74  .3339 
52  .6341  3.68  .3722 
53  .6971  3.60  .4108 
54  .7650  3.52  .4493 
55  .8508  0  .497  1 
56  .923%  0  .5362 
57  .9997  0  .5966 
58  1.0859  0  .6762 
59  1.1868  0  .7968 
60  1.3042  0  .9721 
61  1.4337  0  1.2319 
62  1  S748  0  1.5857 
63  I .7329  0  2.0619 
64  1.8932  0  2.6739 
Source: H.  E. Winklevoss, Pension Mathematics, with Numerical Illustrations  (Homewood, 
Ill.: R. D.  Irwin, 1977). 366  Jerry R. Green 
Table 12.3 
Age  Mortality 
20  .00050 
21  .00052 
22  ,00054 
23  .OW57 
24  ,00059 
25  .00062 
26  .00065 
27  .00068 
28  .00072 
29  .00076 
30  .00081 
31  .00086 
32  .00092 
33  ,00098 
34  .00105 
35  ,00112 
36  .00120 
37  ,00129 
38  .00140 
39  .00151 
1971 Male Group Annuity Mortality Rates 

















































































Age  Mortality 
80  .08743 
81  .09545 
82  .I0369 
83  .11230 
84  .I2112 
85  .13010 
86  .13931 
87  .14871 
88  .15849 
89  .16871 
90  .17945 
91  .19049 
92  .20168 
93  .21299 
94  .22653 
95  .24116 
96  .25620 
91  .27248 
98  .29016 
99  .30912 
Age  Mortality 
100  .32983 
101  ,35245 
102  ,37722 
103  .40621 
104  .44150 
105  .48518 
106  .53934 
107  .60609 
108  .68747 
109  .78543 
110  1.00000 
Source: Winklevoss, Pension Mathematics (see table  12.2 n.). 
quently dies receives nothing, although the specification of Plan 1 is argu- 
ably vague on that point (does “preretirement” death imply that the work- 
er is actively working at that point in time?). 
The result of this simulation is that workers end up in one of the four 
branches of the tree depicted in figure 12.1. The probabilities of  each of 
these four terminal states, for workers of differing initial ages are shown 
in table 12.4. 
12.4  Results of Simulations: First Set 
The first set of simulations treats all the benefits from the four plans ex- 
actly as specified in section  12.2. Table 12.5 shows the expected present 
values in each of the plans from the point of view of workers at various 
ages and various levels of experience. In all circumstances, Plan 3 is the 
most generous and Plan 0 is second. 
Interesting  differences  appear between  Plan 1, the pattern plan, and 
Plan 2, the career average plan. The former is much better at the older and 
more experienced end of the spectrum and the latter is superior for younger 
and less experienced workers. Both age and experience are important de- 
terminants of the relative benefits. The 45-year-olds with only five years 
of experience clearly prefer the career average plan, while those with 20 367  The Riskiness of Private Pensions 
Table  12.4  Probability of a Worker’s Ending the Simulation in Each State 
Retires 
Withdraw  with Benefits 














































Note: In the second set of simulations, a more complex simulation of the decision to with- 
draw voluntarily from the plan is made. This allows years of experience in the plan as well as 
age to affect the withdrawal probability. The probabilities of death and disability remain ex- 
clusively age dependent. This change results in only minor shifts in the cumulative withdraw- 
al probabilites, predictably being lower for the more experienced workers within each age 
cohort. 
Table 12.5  Expected Present Values of Pension Benefits 
Plan 0:  Plan 1:  Plan 2:  Plan 3: 










5 years’ experience 
10 years’ experience 

































Note: Flow of benefits over worker’s and spouse’s lifetime at 1 To  real discount rate. 
years of experience have a preference for the pattern plan, risk consider- 
ations aside. 
Table 12.6 shows the correlations between the present value of the wage 
stream remaining and the present value of benefits as specified in the plan. 
Quite naturally  there is a substantial  correlation  in  Plans 0, 2, and 3, 
where benefits are proportional to some sort of salary average, although 
the precise provisions vary from one to the other. But note also that Plan 1 
displays a high correlation, indeed, the highest at the younger ends of the 368  Jerry R.  Green 
Table 12.6  Correlations between Wages and Pension Benefits 
Plan 0:  Plan 1:  Plan 2:  Plan 3: 
Conventional  Pattern  Career Average  Final Salary 
0 experience 
Age 25  .78  .80  .78  .77 
Age 40  .66  .76  .71  .66 
Age 30  .76  .76  .77  .67 
Age 45  .67  .68  .58  .42 
Age 35  .66  .62  .65  .47 
Age 50  .55  .48  .45  .30 
Age 45  .52  .46  .48  .38 
Age 60  .37  .19  .31  .I2 
5 years’ experience 
10 years’ experience 
20 years’ experience 
spectrum. This is due to the simulation of the real wage process as highly 
autoregressive. The present value of an individual’s wages is substantially 
influenced by the general level of wages in the economy in which he lives. 
Those with favorable experiences, in my simulation, enjoy the benefits of 
a high wage as individuals, on average, as well as a high level of pension 
benefits because these are proportional to the average wage. This effect is 
attenuated only for the oldest workers-those  at 60 years old with 20 years 
of  experience. The effective fluctuation in their benefits is sharply cur- 
tailed because the level of benefits for any one individual is assumed not to 
be adjusted after age 65. Subsequent variations in workers’ real wages do 
not induce any dispersions in the benefits received by a cohort of retired 
workers. Moreover, having already lived to 60, the largest portion of the 
fluctuations in wages is already behind them, and the wages remaining 
vary only slightly within the final five working years. 
Table 12.7 shows the risks inherent in the various plans for the total 
compensation of workers. Because the plans differ in the level of benefits 
provided, some adjustment had to be made to equate their average returns 
before a meaningful comparison of risks could be attempted. The proce- 
dure I used is as follows. The benefit levels of Plans 1, 2, and 3 were fac- 
tored up by  an amount such that their average payoff to all workers is 
equal to that in Plan 0. The age/experience distribution of the work force 
is assumed to be uniform over the eight classes. Then, the coefficient of 
variation of the present value of wages, pension benefits, and their sum 
was computed for each plan and each agelexperience category. This pro- 
cedure is justified by the idea that the expected costs of the benefit package, 
as viewed by the firm, are the relevant aspect of the bargaining agreement. 
Such a bargain, whether explicit or implicit, is struck collectively, covering 
all workers in the firm whatever the age and experience they happen to 
have at the time. Table 12.7  Ratios of  Standard Deviations to Means: Wages, Pensions, and Total Compensation 
Plan 0:  Plan 1:  Plan 2:  Plan 3: 
Conventional  Pattern  Career Average  Final Salary 










5 years’ experience 
10 years’ experience 









































































*Wages are the same in every plan simulation. 370  Jerry R.  Green 
The results are quite unambiguous. Plan 3, the final salary plan, is the 
safest at all ages and experience levels. This is somewhat surprising at first 
glance because the level of benefits depends heavily on events at the end of 
the working life. It might seem that Plan 3 is considerably more risky than 
plans, such as the career average plan, that allow a wider dependence on 
such stochastic phenomena and presumably more pooling of risk over the 
workers’ lifetimes. The reason for the result, as can be seen in table 12.2, 
is the low correlation between these benefits and lifetime wages. A worker 
who wants a safe lifetime earnings package should prefer a plan whose 
benefits are not overly sensitive to his own lifetime wages. This is precisely 
why Plan 3 does well. 
One might ask why the pattern plan (Plan 1) is not best in this regard, 
since its benefits are fixed and independent of the worker’s wage. Indeed, 
Plan 1 ranks as the second safest at every age/experience class except the 
45-year-olds with five years of experience,  where the difference is  very 
small. The reason might be that the pattern plan is based on  terminal aver- 
age wages, whereas the so-called final salary plan is based on an average 
of four years’ salary, which allows an intertemporal pooling of wage risk. 
In addition, however, other types of benefits are included in the plans, and 
Plans 1 and 3 differ in these regards. Plan 1 provides a disability benefit and 
Plan 3  does not, and there is a slight difference in their preretirement 
health benefits. To sort out the components of  these risks more carefully 
we present a set of conditional calculations below. 
Economic theory and common sense tell us that the risks inherent in 
any asset cannot be assessed without reference to other random factors 
with which they may be correlated. The calculations above are based on a 
presumption that the worker cannot offset any of his wage or pension risk 
by other market actions. Thus far we have neglected the fact that many of 
the fluctuations in pension benefits are in direct response to events in the 
worker’s lifetime. 
The termination of benefits on the death of  a retired worker represents 
an annuity aspect of the pension contract that may well be preferable to  its 
equivalent in terms of expected present value, paid in cash. Similarly, the 
need for money in the event of disability or preretirement death is not the 
same as if the individual were continuing to work within the same firm. 
At the most detailed level of generality the utility function should be 
conditioned on the “state” realized by the worker, the state being a full de- 
scription of all relevant events in his or  his family’s life. As an  approxima- 
tion of this, I present some calculations of the riskiness of various plans 
conditional on certain categories of lifetime experience.  Specifically, I 
look at those subsets of  my 900 simulated individuals in each age/exper- 
ience category that reach the states of  disability, voluntary withdrawal, 
preretirement death, or retirement. I make no attempt to  distinguish indi- 
viduals according to the age at which the first three of these events take 371  The Riskiness of  Private Pensions 
place. Needless to say, this approximation is a coarse one because the se- 
verity of the loss in future income, from the surviving family’s point of 
view, is quite sensitive to their stage in the life cycle. 
Tables 12.8, 12.9, 12.10, and 12.1 I present these conditional calcula- 
tions for four events. Individuals are grouped into disability, preretire- 
ment death, and withdrawal categories. In table 12.  I1 I group those who 
have withdrawn from the plan together with those who retire. These indi- 
viduals are likely to have had similar experiences regarding health and 
lifetime work patterns. To this extent they are in the same state. But it 
Table 12.8  Ratios of Standard Deviations to Means: Conditional on 
Preretirement Death 
Plan 0:  Plan 1:  Plan 2:  Plan 3: 




.440  .469  ,440  .495 
.357  .441  .512  .478 
5 years’ experience: 
Age 30  .496  .536  .496  .521 
Age 45  .417  .442  .417  .479 
10 years’ experience: 
Age 35  .440  .486  .440  SO7 
Age 50  .462  .495  .462  .535 
Age 45  .487  .544  .487  .553 
Age 60  .458  .433  .458  A77 
20 years’ experience: 
Table 12.9  Ratios of  Standard Deviation to Means: Total Compensation 
Conditional on Withdrawal 
Plan 0:  Plan 1:  Plan 2:  Plan 3: 




1.082  1.074  1.135  1.091 
.698  .739  .769  .762 
5 years’ experience: 
Age 30  .833  .825  .856  .818 
Age 45  .701  .710  332  .491 
Age 35  .663  .629  .644  .583 
Age 50  .418  .389  ,362  .362 
10 years’ experience: 
20 years’ experience: 
Age 45  .488  .434  .402  .a4 
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Table 12.10  Ratios of Standard Deviations to Means: Total Compensation 
Conditional on Disability 
Plan 0:  Plan 1:  Plan 2:  Plan 3: 










5 years’ experience: 
10 years’ experience: 

































Table 12.11  Ratios of  Standard Deviations to Means: Total Compensation 
Conditional on Retire or Withdraw 
Plan 0:  Plan  1:  Plan 2:  Plan 3: 










5 years’ experience: 
10 years’ experience: 

































must be recognized  that those younger workers who withdraw from the 
firm  will  have  other earnings  and presumably  other pension  benefits. 
Thus the dispersion in total compensation induced by their withdrawal is 
likely to be highly negatively correlated with other earnings, and to that 
extent the figures presented in the table are an overestimate of the risks in- 
herent in the plan. The comparison across plans, however, should be rel- 
evant. And for older workers the “retire or withdraw” category consists 
almost entirely of retirements. 
Table 12.1  1 indicates a considerable degree of similarity between these 
conditional results and the unconditional  results of  table 12.3. Plan 3 is 373  The Riskiness of Private Pensions 
the  safest  for almost  every  agelexperience  category.  Only the oldest 
group, 60-year-olds with 20 years of experience, find Plan 0 safer than 
Plan 3. And for this group the four plans are so similar that the discrepancy 
is probably within the sampling error of the simulation. 
The other conditional tables 12.8, 12.9, and 12.10  display a wider diver- 
gence from the unconditional calculations shown in table 12.7. Preretire- 
ment death benefits are paid only in Plans  1 and 3. Therefore all of  the 
variances in total compensation in Plans 0 and 2, conditional on preretire- 
ment death, arise from the distribution of  wages and the dispersion in 
working intervals until the death occurs. 
Disability benefits are most generous under Plan 1. Since disability re- 
sults in a termination of wages, the variance of total compensation is re- 
duced to the extent that benefits compensate for this loss in income. Thus 
Plan 3 does poorly because it incorporates no provision for disability. 
Plan 2 is safe for older, experienced workers because they receive fuller 
compensation, but it does poorly for those disabled early in their careers 
because their benefits are sharply curtailed. 
12.5  Results of Simulations: Second Set 
Taking the pension plans as written and simulating their ultimate bene- 
fits, as is done in section 12.4 has left us with some unresolved issues. The 
variance in total benefits depends very much on benefits other than those 
paid at retirement. In order to compare benefit formulas more directly, I 
shall redo the simulations, suppressing all benefits except those received at 
retirement. 
The variability in payoff still depends on all the stochastic factors men- 
tioned in sections 12.3 and 12.4. When these simulations were run, a more 
elaborate and realistic probability structure for withdrawal was incorpo- 
rated.  Voluntary withdrawal  from employment depends on experience 
within the firm as well as on age.' This change produces slightly different 
frequencies in the terminal states reached by the 900 people whose life- 
times are simulated, but they are small relative to the sampling errors in 
this calculation. 
This simulation allows a cleaner comparison of the four pension benefit 
formulas. I look first at the mean benefits. As in section 12.4, I adjust the 
level of payoffs so that the average mean payoff is equalized for a popula- 
tioh equally distributed over the 10 age/experience groups. Then I com- 
pare the mean retirement benefit as it would be prospectively viewed by 
the representative worker in each group. The results are shown in figure 
12.2. 
I.  I am grateful to Peter Diamond for references  to the work of Yves Baker that were very 
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Age 
Each point  shows  lhe beneflls received  01  retlrement, on overage,  In the indicated  plan 
Points  marked  ore  the  beneflls lor Ihe workers  whose  experience  is 25years less 
than their  oge.  Pomls marked +  ore  for  workers  with experience 40 yenrs  less thnn 
their oge.  The  number  indicates  the  plan.  Benefit  levels ore  odjusled  so  lhot the 
average  overall  ten  oge/experlence  groups  IS the same  In each plon. 
Fig. 12.2  Mean present value of benefits in the second set of 
simulations. 
Younger workers find Plan 2, prospectively, the most favorable. Mid- 
dle-aged, experienced workers rank Plan 0 highest. But their contempor- 
aries with little experience rank it poorly. The final salary plan, Plan 3, 
does very badly for the younger workers and very well for the older ones. 
It would be interesting to see whether the form of benefit calculation 
was systematically related to whether a well-defined subset of the workers 
had the predominant  share of  the negotiating  power.  Presumably  this 
would vary across industries  and across union versus nonunion  firms. 
This must be left for future research. 
The second use to which this simulation is put is a reassessment of the 
variability comparisons performed in section 12.4. The results are reported 
in tables 12.12 and 12.13. Because only retirement benefits are included, I 
report the conditional coefficient of  dispersion of these benefits for re- 
tired persons only. These results in table 12.13 reveal the same general pat- 
tern as the comparable calculation in table 12.11. Plan 3, the final salary 
plan, is the safest throughout almost the entire age/experience spectrum. 
It is only for the 40-, 45,  and 50-year-olds with 0,5,  and 10 years of expe- 
rience, respectively, that Plan  l, the pattern plan, seems slightly safer. 
Even these comparisons are probably within the sampling error. 
On an overall, ex ante basis, table 12.12 indicates that Plan 3 is always 
the safest. These conditional calculations strongly confirm those reported 
in table 12.7. 375  The Riskiness of Private Pensions 
Table 12.12  Ratio of  Standard Errors to Means: Second Set of  Simulations Only 
Retirement Benefits Are Paid (All Workers). 
Experience  Age  Plan 0  Plan 1  Plan 2  Plan 3 
0  25 
40 
5  30 
40 
10  35 
50 
15  40 
55 










































Table 12.13  Ratio of  Standard Errors to Means: Second Set of  Simulations 
Only Retirement Benefits Are Paid: Only Retired Workers with Vested 
Benefits Included 
Experience  Age  Plan 0  Plan 1  Plan 2  Plan 3 
0  25 
40 
5  30 
45 
10  35 
50 
15  40 
55 










































Comment  Alan J. Auerbach 
This paper is in some ways easy to discuss but in other ways difficult. Jerry 
Careen has carefully laid out for us what he has done, so that we may 
pause at each stage for an evaluation. Ultimately, however, I find it hard 
to know what message about the riskiness of private pensions I should 
take away from the simulation results that are presented in the paper. For 
me, much of the difficulty lies in the concept of risk that Green uses, the 
different sources of risk in the pensions analyzed, and the many assump- 
tions necessary to generate concrete numerical examples. All in all, the pa- 
Alan J. Auerbach is associate professor of economics at the University of  Pennsylvania 
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per has helped clarify a number of issues that one must confront in assess- 
ing the risk inherent in private pension plans, and in the process has shown 
how difficult a task Green has set for himself. He should be commended 
for his efforts in exploring this extremely important but little researched 
question. 
The numerical simulations in the paper consider the riskiness of  four 
prototypical private pension plans, as measured by the coefficient of vari- 
ation of the present value of pension benefits or total compensation, from 
the viewpoint of a representative worker at one of  eight stages in his age 
and experience with a firm. Simulation is used because of the enormous 
complexity of the underlying random distribution of pension benefits. 
Each worker, identical ex ante, faces four sources of uncertainty:  (1) 
date of death; (2) the prospect of preretirement disability; (3) the prospect 
of preretirement withdrawal from the firm; and (4) the stochastic evolu- 
tion of wages over time. All sources of risk are assumed to be exogenous 
from the individual’s viewpoint, as well as independent. This rules out, 
for example, the withdrawal probability’s being related to the individual’s 
wage rate or the date of death’s being hastened by early disability. These 
simplifications may be restrictive, but there is little alternative available, 
given the paucity of data and the great complexity already characterizing 
the problem. 
The age-specific probabilities of death, disability, and withdrawal, pre- 
sented in table  12.2, are based on actuarial data. The wage process is 
assumed to be one with an overall stochastic component, as well as indi- 
vidual-specific, or “idiosyncratic,” risk. An individual’s wage at date t, 
Wf,  may be expressed in terms of his last year’s wage by 
Wf  = Wf-1(1  + Wf  + Vf), 
where Wf  is the overall, or “market,” disturbance, itself generated by a 
Markov process with an autocorrelation coefficient of  .9, and Vf  is an in- 
dependent and identically distributed individual error. Both 7,  and the 
white noise component underlying the process for W,  are normally distrib- 
uted, the latter with a nonzero mean intended to capture secular wage 
growth at an expected rate of 1070 per year. Without the term Wf,  this wage 
process would be a random walk in terms of the logarithm of the wage. 
With the highly autocorrelated market component, wherein the growth 
rate of overall wages is very close to a random walk, actual wage variation 
over time comes to consist more and more of  the market component. 
Whether this outcome is appropriate is a question Green does not address, 
nor are we given any reason to have strong faith in the variances chosen 
for the two sources of risk that generate the wage process. Even if these as- 
sumptions come from the best “point estimate” available, a sensitivity 
analysis would be most enlightening. 377  The Riskiness of Private Pensions 
The four pension plans considered vary with respect to the method of 
retirement benefit calculation and the extent to which they provide dis- 
ability and survivor preretirement death benefits. They also differ with re- 
spect to the treatment of early retirement, but early retirement is ignored 
in the simulations. Vesting provisions are similar with full or partial vest- 
ing at 10 years of  service with any remaining vesting occurring shortly 
afterward. 
Retirement benefits under  Plan 0 (conventional), 2 (career average), 
and 3 (final salary) are all based on some average over time of an individ- 
ual’s own wages, with the names of  the plans reflecting fairly accurately 
the extent of averaging. Since there is no inflation in the model, one would 
expect that Plans 0 and 2, which are based on salaries from a certain num- 
ber of the best years, would be more likely to include wages from early 
years; that is the case in reality. Plan 1, the pattern plan, provides for a 
fixed dollar amount multiplied by years of service, but Green interprets 
this, appropriately I think, as being implicitly indexed to overall wages in 
the year of  retirement. One should note, of  course, that this assumption 
ignores additional risks that would be associated with the presence of 
noise in the implicit indexing process. 
The four plans also differ in their  provision of  death and disability 
benefits. Plan 0 provides neither, Plan  1 provides both, Plan 2 provides 
only for disability, Plan 3 only for death. The spanning of the set of possi- 
bilities is either quite fortunate or quite unfortunate, depending on where 
one’s interest lies. I must vote for the latter, if what we seek is to under- 
stand the effects of various pension provisions on individual welfare rather 
than the impact of  particular plans themselves. This is a problem that 
could be remedied by considering hypothetical plans that differed only 
with respect to benefit calculations or only with respect to auxillary provi- 
sions. At present, I suspect that the differences among the plans in the lat- 
ter are what generate many of the differences in the results for the plans. 
This may be inferred from table 12.6, which presents the sample correla- 
tions between the present values of  wages and benefits for individuals 
starting at each of the eight points analyzed in the paper. The lowest value, 
.12, occurs for individuals who are age 60, despite the fact that, for those 
who reach retirement at 65, pension benefits will be based on the four 
highest  years of  own wages, quite possibly four of  the remaining five 
years. One would expect this to lead to a high correlation, but this ignores 
the fact that states in which death or disability intervene are included in 
the calculation. While such states have a relatively small chance of occur- 
ring, the change in benefits if they do is enormous. 
This result foreshadows a problem in separating the effects of particu- 
lar differences among plans but also brings out another difficulty with the 
analysis: the symmetric treatment of all states of nature. For example, a 378  Jerry R. Green 
plan with a death benefit equal to half the nominal retirement amount 
might be just what would be required to  insure completely per capita fam- 
ily consumption against a husband’s death, yet this plan would be deemed 
riskier than one with full death benefits. Similar problems are associated 
with disability. There is a particular  problem in the treatment of  with- 
drawal, where all subsequent work experience and pension benefit accru- 
als are ignored. Given the usual backloading of  benefit accruals associated 
with pensions, a person withdrawing to take a better job would, by the 
current analysis, receive a low benefit relative to  wages, even if vested. Fi- 
nally, since the analysis considers only the risks associated with pensions 
and wages, we have no sense of which sources of risk are diversifiable and 
which are not. Even for those workers who are liquidity constrained, so- 
cial security constitutes an important form of wealth that may offset some 
of the risks included in private pensions. Indeed, some of the pension pro- 
visions may have been designed to take the preexistence of  social security 
into account. 
With all of these difficulties in mind, I turn at last to the paper’s simula- 
tion results. These results were generated for each of the eight cases by fol- 
lowing 900 individuals through their working lives until some terminal 
event occurred.  For example, no wage calculations were necessary for 
those already disabled. The same sample of  900 is used for each of  the 
four pension plans in a given case, so that eight samples were generated 
overall. While Green argues that this sample size appeared large enough to 
eliminate most sampling error, this statement does not apply to subsam- 
ples as small as 11, conditioned on certain events such as disability. 
Because I am unsure how to  interpret the measured risk associated with 
withdrawal, disability, or death, I would find most meaningful calcula- 
tions based on the condition of a worker actually reaching retirement. The 
closest Green comes to presenting such results is in table 12.1  1, which also 
includes those that withdraw. To focus on retirement, we can look at cal- 
culations for those of later ages for whom withdrawal is unlikely, and here 
there is a counterintuitive result: as in the full-sample calculations in table 
12.7, the final salary plan is generally the safest. It is safer than the pattern 
plan in all but two of the eight cases in the table, even though the pattern 
plan is independent of the risks of  individual wage variation. It is safer 
than the career average plan in all eight cases, and safer than the conven- 
tional plan in seven of eight, despite the fact that the latter two plans 
should permit more lifetime averaging of wage risks. I find the robustness 
of these results disturbing, because I can think of no convincing explana- 
tion for them. This demonstrates, perhaps, one of the weaknesses of sim- 
ulation analysis of complicated problems: we  cannot simply look at the 
formula for a derivative to see the origin of an outcome. However, sensi- 
tivity analysis is the best available alternative and would be a most helpful 
addition to the current study in light of the results presented. 